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Burying Our Heads in the Sand:
Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance
and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence
by Nancy Chi Cantalupo*
ABSTRACT
This article discusses why two laws that seek to prevent and end sexual violence between
students on college campuses, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and
the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery
Act”), are failing to fulfill that goal and how these legal regimes can be improved to reach this
goal. It explicates how Title IX and the Clery Act ignore or exacerbate a series of “information
problems” that create incentives for schools to “bury their heads in the sand” with regard to
campus peer sexual violence. These information problems include: 1) the damage to a school’s
public image that can come from increased reporting of the violence; 2) the persistent myth that
such violence is committed mainly by strangers; 3) the lack of awareness by most school
officials about the violence and a school’s legal obligations with regard to preventing the
violence; and 4) the prohibitively expensive broad-based education and training that correcting
such information problems would require. Several legal deficiencies emerge from this
examination, including: 1) problems arising from the “actual notice” prong of the test created by
the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District and Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education; 2) problems related to the Department of Education’s administrative
enforcement of Title IX; and 3) problems with the campus crime reporting provisions of the
Clery Act. The article discusses each deficiency in turn, how each serves to enable schools’ lack
of knowledge and avoidance of knowledge about peer sexual violence, and how each fails to
solve or exacerbates the information problems faced by schools, students, and parents. Finally,
the article concludes with a series of recommendations for changes that should be made to Title
IX, the Clery Act, and their enforcement regimes to address these information problems and
ultimately to prevent and end the persistent problem of campus peer sexual violence.
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In 2009, the Journal of College and University Law published my comprehensive review
of the law governing school liability when one of a school’s students sexually assaults or is
otherwise sexually violent toward another of the school’s students. My central conclusion as a
result of that review was that schools face much greater liability from inadequately protecting
student victims1 of such peer sexual violence than schools do from expelling and otherwise
disciplining students found responsible for perpetrating the violence. Furthermore, my review of
not only the law but also the social science research regarding peer sexual violence on college
and university campuses indicates that the liability scheme reflects quite accurately how the
problem of campus peer sexual violence is perpetuated by the college or university itself.
Finally, because of these dynamics, school processes that imitate and draw from procedures used
in the criminal justice system both do not help a school address campus peer sexual violence and
actually create greater risks of liability for the school. I concluded that, because of the much
greater liability faced by the school for not properly protecting student victims of peer sexual
violence, the law creates an incentive for schools to disassociate their internal processes and
procedures related to student misconduct from a criminal model and to create a sui generis
administrative model that responds to the goals and powers of schools, not those of a coercive
state.
Given how clear this legal incentive is, why do a wide variety of sources indicate that
many colleges and universities appear to act exactly opposite to the incentives that the liability
scheme sets up? This wide variety of sources includes a recent, in-depth, nine-month
investigation on campus peer sexual violence, conducted by the Center for Public Integrity
(“CPI”) in late 2009 and early 2010, with companion pieces by National Public Radio, four
regional news networks, and Nightline.2 In addition, the CPI study simply confirms what I have
1

A note about language: I will use “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably to refer to people who claim they have
been victims of sexual violence. Therefore, “victim” is not a term of art used to indicate a finding of responsibility
for sexual violence. I may use “accuser” when discussing the role of the victim/survivor in a disciplinary
proceeding. I will use “perpetrator” or “assailant” when someone accused of sexual violence has been found
responsible or in discussions where it can be assumed the person perpetrated the sexual violence, such as statistical
analyses. I will use “accused” or “alleged” to indicate when I am referring to those who have been charged but not
found responsible for committing sexual violence. Finally, I will use female pronouns to refer to victims because
the majority of victims are women, and male pronouns to refer to perpetrators and accused students because the
majority of perpetrators and accused students are men.
I use “sexual violence” instead of terms such as “sexual assault” or “rape” because in my view “sexual
violence” is a broader, descriptive term that is, once again, not a term of art, and which I regard to include a wider
range of actions that may not fit certain legal or readers’ definitions of “sexual assault” or “rape.” The term
therefore includes “sexual assault” or “rape,” as well as other actions involving physical contact of a sexual nature
that may not always fit everyone’s definition of “sexual assault” or “rape.” While I acknowledge that non-physical
actions can constitute violence, including those forms of violence is outside the scope of this paper.
I use “school” and “institution” to identify either K-12 schools or higher education institutions, although I
use “college,” “university,” “campus” or “higher education” to refer to the latter category of schools.
Finally, my definition of “report” and “reporting” is not a technical one. I regard a report as any time a
victim tells any professional with any role or authority to help her about the violence, including but not limited to
medical, counseling, security or conduct-related, residential life or other student affairs personnel, as well as faculty
and community or campus advocates.
2
Center for Public Integrity, Sexual Assault on Campus,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); Center for Public
Integrity, “Nightline” spotlights campus assault issue investigated by the Center,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/2388/?utm_source=publicintegrity&utm_medium=related_heds&utm_ca
mpaign=side_v1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
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heard repeatedly from lawyers, faculty and administrators involved in cases of campus peer
sexual violence both within and outside of schools: that school adjudications of campus peer
sexual violence cases are “kangaroo courts” with the deck stacked in favor of the alleged
perpetrator, and that a survivor of campus peer sexual violence needs independent representation
and cannot rely on her school to protect her rights. These impressions are further confirmed by
the facts of various cases litigated under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (“Title
IX”), cases where the court has reached the “deliberate indifference” prong of the test for school
liability set out in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 US 274 (1998)
(“Gebser”) and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (“Davis”).
Accordingly, this article explores the reasons behind many schools’ tendency to act
against their own liability interests in the area of campus peer sexual violence and asks how the
law does or does not encourage schools to act in this fashion. Part I reviews what we know
about both campus peer sexual violence and how many colleges and universities handle reports
of such violence. This review reveals that colleges and universities face serious information
problems when it comes to campus peer sexual violence, information problems that create
incentives opposite to those created by the existing liability structure. These information
problems, at best, cause schools to be generally unaware of the laws and the underlying campus
peer sexual violence problem, and, at worse, create countervailing incentives for schools to
actively avoid knowledge of both.
Part II then examines what, if anything, the law does to alleviate or exacerbate these
information problems and the incentives that can arise from them. Several legal deficiencies
emerge from this examination, including problems arising from the “actual notice” prong of the
Gebser/Davis test, problems related to the Department of Education’s administrative
enforcement of Title IX, and problems with the campus crime reporting provisions of the Jeanne
Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”).
Part II discusses each deficiency in turn, how each serves to enable the lack of knowledge and
avoidance of knowledge by schools about peer sexual violence happening on their campuses, and
how each fails to solve the information problems faced by schools, students, and parents.
Finally, Part III discusses various changes that need to be made to existing laws and
enforcement regimes for the incentive structures surrounding campus peer sexual violence to be
influenced in a meaningful way. Although school liabilities under Title IX, the Clery Act and
constitutional law related to accused students’ due process rights clearly encourage schools to
address the campus peer sexual violence problem in a meaningful and responsible way, the
information problems discussed here create quite opposite incentives, incentives that account in
part for our collective failure over the last three decades to end or significantly prevent the
epidemic of peer sexual violence that afflicts our campuses.
I.

Campus Peer Sexual Violence: The Problem and the Information Problems

Is it fair to characterize campus peer sexual violence as an epidemic? The statistics
suggest yes. The comprehensive studies on campus-based, peer sexual violence that have been
completed over the last several decades consistently find that 20-25% of college women are
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victims of attempted or completed non-consensual sex during their time in college.3 Estimates of
the victimization of college men range from 64 - 15%,5 but “since so few men report, information
is limited about the extent of the problem.”6 However, we do know that “[c]ollege men who are
raped are usually raped by other men.”7
College and university women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence. “Women
ages 16 to 24 experience rape at rates four times higher than the assault rate of all women,
making the college (and high school) years the most vulnerable for women. [Furthermore,]
college women are more at risk for rape and other forms of sexual assault than women the same
age but not in college.”8 Sexual assaults most often happen during the times college women are
most vulnerable, during a victim’s first-years in college,9 often during the first week they are on
campus.10

3

Brenda J. Benson et al., College Women and Sexual Assault: The Role of Sex-related Alcohol Expectancies, 22 J.
FAM. VIOLENCE 341, 348 (2007); CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY: FINAL
REPORT, 5-3 (Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding that 19% of students in the sample had experienced
attempted or completed sexual assault since entering college, but noting that over 50% of the sample had completed
less than 2 years of college and therefore discussing the incidence reported by college seniors, where 26% had
experienced attempted or completed sexual assault since entering college, to predict a woman’s risk during her
overall college career). See also BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10
(2000), available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf, CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL
ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 6 (Lexington Books 1993). Note: although some of the
studies that are cited here are somewhat old, they are included because the findings of the older studies are quite
consistent with the most recent ones, even when the studies have been conducted in different decades. This
indicates that the findings of older studies are still valid in terms of what we see today. PLEASE NOTE THAT
THIS ARTICLE IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING EDITED FOR PUBLICATION. THEREFORE, THE
FOOTNOTES HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, AND THEIR PROPER NUMBERING IS NOT
REFLECTED IN THIS DRAFT.
4
See KREBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-5.
5
See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 6.
6
RANA SAMPSON, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (U.S. Dep’t of Just., Problem-Oriented Guides
for Police Series No. 17, 2003), available at: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id. at 2. But see KATRINA BAUM & PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS, 1995-2002 3 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf (finding that
college students were less likely to be the victim of sexual assault than non-students). The discrepancy in these two
findings is due to the wording of questions asked during data collection. See FISHER, ET AL, supra note 3, at 13
(explicitly comparing the difference between the National Crime Victimization Survey methodology and results and
the National College Women Sexual Victimization study methodology and results).The conclusions of Baum and
Klaus are based on the National Crime Victimization Survey, which gathers information on sexual assault by asking
category-centered questions, such as “Has anyone attacked or threatened you in [this way]: rape, attempted rape or
other type of sexual attack.” See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violent Victimization of College Students, 1995-2002,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=593 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). The conclusions that Sampson
cites are based on studies such as the National College Women Sexual Victimization study, which use behaviororiented questions, such as “Has anyone made you have sexual intercourse by using force or threatening to harm you
or someone close to you?” See FISHER, supra note 3, at 6. Other than the wording of the questions, the basic
methodology of the two studies was identical, yet behavior-oriented questions have been found to produce 11 times
the number of reported rapes. Id. at 11.
9
See KREBS ET AL., supra note 3, at XIV.
10
See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 26.
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The vast majority of sexual violence that student victims experience is not at the hands of
a stranger but of someone they know. 11 In one study, 12.8% of completed rapes, 35% of
attempted rapes and 22.9% of threatened rapes took place on a date.12 Typical perpetrators
include classmates and friends of the survivor and boyfriends or ex-boyfriends.13
Studies on college men indicate that 6-14.9% of them “report acts that meet legal
definitions for rape or attempted rape,”14 and that a small number of repeat perpetrators commit
most of the sexual violence and likely contribute to other violence problems as well. A 2002
study surveyed 1882 male students at a university15 and found that 6.4% self-reported acts
qualifying as rape or attempted rape. Of this group, 63.3% reported committing repeat rapes16
averaging about six rapes a piece.17 In addition, these “undetected” (i.e. not arrested or
prosecuted) rapists each committed an average of 14 additional acts of interpersonal violence
(battery, physical and/or sexual abuse of children, and sexual assault short of rape or attempted
rape),18 meaning that 4% of the students in the study accounted for 28% of the violence, nearly
10 times that of non-rapists (1.41 acts of violence a piece19) and 3.5 times that of single-act
rapists (3.98 acts of violence a piece20).21 A more limited study in 1987 “found that 96 college
men accounted for 187 rapes.”22
Other studies, as well as news items from various campuses, indicate that there are many
rape supportive attitudes among college men. For instance, in October of 2010, a Yale fraternity
had its pledges chant outside the university’s women’s center, “No means yes! Yes means
anal!”23 This incident was not an isolated one, but was merely a repeat of an incident involving
fraternity men, the campus Women’s Center and the same chant in 2006.24 A student member of
the Women’s Center said that such incidents “tend to repeat themselves every year or two” at
Yale,25 and this last incident spurred a group of Yale students to file a Title IX complaint against
Yale.26 Moreover, sociological studies have confirmed wide subscription to such attitudes
among college men beyond those at Yale. A 2001 study found significant peer support for

11

See Id. at 26. See also KREBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-18; FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 17.
See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 17.
13
See id. at 19. See also KREBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-15.
14
David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).
15
See id. at 76.
16
See id. at 78.
17
See id. at 80.
18
See id. at 78.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id. at 80.
22
MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER S. DEKESEREDY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF
MALE PEER SUPPORT 12 (1997).
23
Michael Kimmel, The Men, And Women, of Yale, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG, Oct. 17, 2010,
http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/10/17/the-men-and-women-of-yale/.
24
Id.
25
Jordi Gasso & Sam Greenberg, DKE Apologizes for Pledge Chants, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2010,
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/oct/15/dke-apologizes-for-pledge-chants/.
26
Yale is Subject of a Title IX Inquiry, New York Times, Mar. 31, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/us/01yale.html.
12
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sexual violence among college men.27 A study in 1993 found that 5-8% of college men commit
rape knowing it is wrong;28 10-15% of college men commit rape without knowing that it is
wrong;29 and 35% of college men indicated some likelihood that they would rape if they could be
assured of getting away with it.30 Finally, a 1987 study indicated that 30% of men in general say
they would commit rape and 50% would “force a woman into having sex” if they would not get
caught.31
As indicated, these studies suggest linkages between such cultural attitudes and the actual
occurrence of campus peer sexual violence. Multiple studies have shown that perpetrators share
characteristics such as macho attitudes, high levels of anger at women, the need to dominate
women, hyper-masculinity, anti-social behavior and traits, lack of empathy, and abuse of
alcohol.32 The 2001 study mentioned above indicates that, especially in light of the lack of
strong anti-violence messages from campus authority figures, male peer support for sexual
violence likely encourages some men to perpetrate who might not otherwise do so.33
With this rate of peer sexual violence, why does the general public appear to know so
little about it, or at least about its full scope? The surface reason is that 90% or more of
survivors of sexual assault on college campuses do not report the assault,34 but this reason begs
the further question: why do survivors not report? The vast majority of the reasons that victims
give have to do with victims’ fears that they will not be believed or will face hostile treatment,
especially from authority figures. Fear of hostile treatment or disbelief by legal and medical
authorities prevents 24.7% of college rape survivors from reporting.35 Other factors include not
seeing the incidents as harmful,36 not thinking a crime had been committed,37 not thinking what
had happened was serious enough to involve law enforcement,38 not wanting family or others to
know,39 lack of proof,40 and the belief that no one will believe them and nothing will happen to
the perpetrator.41 Moreover, the stakes of a victim’s report not being credited are quite high for
the victim. Not being believed and official mishandling can increase survivor trauma.42

27

Martin D. Schwartz et al., Male Peer Support and a Feminist Routine Activities Theory: Understanding Sexual
Assault on the College Campus, 18 JUST. Q. 623, 641 (2001).
28
See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 21.
29
See id. at 6.
30
See id. at 8.
31
ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 97 (1988).
32
See e.g., Lisak & Miller, supra note 12, at 73; Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 628; BOHMER & PARROT, supra
note 3, at 23.
33
Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 630, 641.
34
See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 24.
35
See id. at 23. See also BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 13, 63; WARSHAW, supra note 28, at 50.
36
See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 23.
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See id. at 24.
40
See id.
41
See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 23; BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 13, 63; WARSHAW, supra note 28, at
50.
42
See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 5, 198.
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Given that studies on attitudes of law enforcement, judges, juries, and prosecutors
indicate that survivor’s fears are often well-founded,43 it is quite understandable that survivors
would avoid reporting. Stories culled from news stories and cases indicate that survivors fare no
better—possibly worse—at many colleges and universities. The treatment that victims can often
expect from their schools when they make a report includes the following:
1) The school does nothing at all.44
2) The school talks to the alleged perpetrator, who denies the allegations, makes no
determination as to which story is more credible,45 and then does nothing, including
nothing to protect the victim from any retaliation from the alleged perpetrator or his
friends as a result of her report.46
3) The school waits or investigates so slowly that it takes months or years for the survivor to
get any redress.47

43

See BEYOND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: USING THE LAW TO HELP RESTORE THE LIVES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
VICTIMS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES 8 (Jessica E. Mindlin et al., eds. 2008), available
at http://www.victimrights.org/pdf-manual/beyondthecriminaljusticesystem.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM]. See also Lisak & Miller, supra note 12, at 74.
44
See, e.g., Kristin Jones, Barriers Curb Reporting on Campus Sexual Assault: Lack of Response Discourages
Victims of Rape, Other Crimes, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/articles/entry/1822/. See also Doe v. Derby Bd. of
Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-8 (D. Conn. 2006); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170
(D. Cal. 2000); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 13011 (D. Kan., 2005);
James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, *6 (W.D. Okla., Oct. 16, 2008); Bruning v.
Carroll Cmty. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 892, 915-6 (N.D. Iowa, 2007); Martin v. Swartz Creek Community
Schools, 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Bashus v. Plattsmouth Community Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56565, *10-1 (D.Neb. 2006); Jones v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-6 (W.D. Pa. 2005);
S.G. v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, *15-6 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ.,
430 F. Supp. 2d 54,63-5 (D. Conn., 2006), aff’d. Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 F. App'x 46, 49 (2nd Cir. 2006).
45
See, e.g., S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 740 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2008); Letter from John E. Palomino to Robin
Wilson (Oct. 23, 1991), in California State University, Chico, OCR Case No. 09-91-2098 (on file with author).
46
See, e.g., Derby, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 444-5; Doe v. Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, *39 (D. S.C. May
25, 2006), Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, *17 (Dist. Ct. Conn. May 19, 2008); S.G.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522 at *10, *14-5; Bashus, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, *10-1; M. v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, *28 (D.Conn. 2008); Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
25, *33 (6th Cir. 2009); Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-1; Jones, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 645-6; Martin, 419 F. Supp. 2d
at 974; Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (C.D. Ill., 2008); James, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82199, *6; E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60; Letter from Cathy H. Lewis to Thomas Crawford (Apr.
16, 1993), in Academy School District, OCR Case No. 08931023 (on file with author) [hereinafter Academy School
District Letter]; Letter from Charlene F. Furr to Jimmy D. Hattabaugh (Apr. 16, 2007), in Mansfield School District,
OCR Case No. 06061390 (on file with author) [hereinafter Mansfield School District Letter].
47
See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding the school took eight months
to respond to reports of a gang rape); Letter from John E. Palomino to Karl Pister (June 15, 1994), in University of
California, Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2141 (on file with author) [hereinafter University of California, Santa
Cruz Letter]; Letter from Thomas J. Hibino to Daniel Kehoe (May 19, 1994), in Millis Public Schools, OCR Case
No. 01-93-1123 (on file with author) [hereinafter Millis Public Schools Letter]; Letter from Charles R. Love to
Glenn Roquemore (Jan. 28, 2003), in Irvine Valley College and the South Orange County Community College
District, OCR Case No. 09-02-2105 (on file with author); Letter from Frankie Furr to James E. Nelson (Aug. 5,
2005), in Richardson Independent School District, OCR Case No. 06031283 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Richardson Independent School District Letter].
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4) School officials investigate in a biased way, including through their treatment of the
survivor or characterization of her case,48 or setting up fact-finding procedures and
hearings with significantly more procedural rights for the accused than the survivor.49
5) School officials investigate and determine that the sexual violence did occur, but do not
discipline or minimally discipline the assailant and do not protect the survivor from any
retaliation.50
6) School officials investigate and determine that the sexual violence did occur, then move
the victim out of her classes or housing or off the school bus that the assailant also takes.
The assailant experiences no disruption to his schedule, housing or transportation to and
from school.51
7) School officials tell the victim not to tell anyone else, including parents and the police.52
8) School officials investigate, including by holding a hearing to determine whether the
allegations are true, find the perpetrator responsible, then tell the victim she cannot tell
anyone about the findings or she will be brought up on disciplinary charges.53
9) School officials require or pressure the survivor to confront her assailant or go through
mediation with him before allowing her to file a complaint for investigation.54

48

See, e.g., Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Kelly v. Yale
Univ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, *3 (D. Conn. March 26, 2003); Erskine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, *33-4;
See Patterson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at *4; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-1; Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F.
Supp. 2d at 823; S.S., 177 P.3d at 740; University of California, Santa Cruz Letter, supra note 44; Letter from John
E. Palomino to Ruben Armiñana (Apr. 29, 1994), in Sonoma State University, OCR Case No. 09-93-2131 (on file
with author) [hereinafter Sonoma State University Letter]; Richardson Independent School Letter, supra note 44.
49
See Letter from Gary D. Jackson to Jane Jervis (Apr. 4, 1995), in The Evergreen State College, OCR Case No.
10922064 (on file with author) [hereinafter Evergreen State College Letter]; University of California, Santa Cruz
Letter, supra note 44.
50
See, e.g., Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954; S.S., 177 P.3d at 739; Hamden, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269 *5; Doe
v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 481 (D.N.H. 1997); Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist.,
231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000); Derby, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447; M., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, *28; Letter
from Patricia Shelton and C. Mack Hall to James C. Enochs (Dec. 10, 1993), in Modesto City Schools, OCR Case
No. 09-93-1319 (on file with author); Millis Public Schools Letter, supra note 44; University of California, Santa
Cruz Letter, supra note 44; Sonoma State University Letter, supra note 45. See also Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of
Consequences for Sexual Assault: Students Found “Responsible” Face Modest Penalties, While Victims are
Traumatized, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Feb. 24, 2010,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/articles/entry/1945/.
51
See, e.g., Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (finding that after victim repeatedly harassed and assaulted the only
action the school took was to move the victim to a different classroom); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, *6 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (same).
52
See, e.g., Oyster River, 992 F. Supp. at 479 (finding that two girls were harassed repeatedly by a boy who exposed
himself to them and touched them on their legs and breasts on the school bus and in school; when they reported the
behavior, the school’s guidance counselor told them not to tell their parents because it could subject the school to
lawsuits); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that after a male student
repeatedly raped a student with spastic cerebral palsy, the school did not inform and told the victim not to inform her
mother).
53
See Press Release, Security on Campus, Inc., Georgetown University Violated Rights Of Rape Victims According
To Federal Review (July 27, 2004),
http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=196:press-releasegeorgetown-university-violated-rights-of-rape-victims-according-to-federal-review-&catid=1:soc-news&Itemid=79
(last visited August 15, 2010) [hereinafter Security on Campus, Georgetown University Violation]; Letter from
Nancy Paula Gifford to S. Daniel Carter, Security on Campus (Nov. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.uvavictimsofrape.com/images/Clery_Act_Ruling.pdf.
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10) School officials distribute a press packet to local media about a survivor after she reports
an assault, stating that she was charged by the school with alcohol consumption and
“disorderly conduct” in connection with the events at issue in her report.55
11) School officials set up a football recruitment program where players and recruits are
“shown a good time” by female college students and keep the program going even in the
face of multiple reports that the female students are being raped by players and recruits.56
12) School officials admit or re-admit student athletes even with knowledge that they have
past criminal or disciplinary violations, including sexual violence.57
These behaviors run counter to what the law requires and, indeed, many of the examples
listed above come from court cases where schools were found to have violated Title IX (or at
least a court allowed the case to proceed to a jury to determine whether Title IX was violated).
Others come from news stories, particularly Kristen Lombardi’s excellent series for the Center
for Public Integrity, and from Department of Education investigations. It is clear from these
various sources that schools are regularly acting contrary to the law.
Furthermore, when schools are sued for such mishandling, the settlements can often be
quite large. For instance, in Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. Colo.
2007) (“Simpson”) when two college women were gang-raped as a part of an unsupervised
football recruiting program that the university had evidence was leading to sexual violence, the
university ultimately paid $2.5 million to one plaintiff, $350,000 to another, hired a special Title
IX analyst and fired some 13 university officials, including the President and football coach.58 In
a case where a student was raped and murdered at Eastern Michigan University and the
university did not tell the family or campus for several months that they suspected a fellow
student, the school eventually agreed to pay $350,000 in fines for 13 separate violations of the

54

See, e.g., S.S., 177 P.3d at 740; Letter from Alan D. Hughes to Susan Whittle (Sept. 14, 2008), in Golden City RIII, OCR Case No. 07071104 (on file with author).
55
Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases: Feeble Watchdog Leaves Students at
Risk, Critics Say, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/articles/entry/1946/ [hereinafter Lax Enforcement of
Title IX] (citing Letter from Carolyn F. Lazaris to John Silber (Apr. 25, 2003), in Boston University, OCR Case No.
01-02-2006, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/assets/pdf/BUfinding.pdf).
56
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that the football coach
“maintained an unsupervised player-host program to show high-school recruits ‘a good time’” despite knowing
generally “of the serious risk of sexual harassment and assault during college-football recruiting efforts; … that such
assaults had indeed occurred during CU recruiting visits; … [and] that there had been no change in atmosphere
since” the last assault).
57
Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss by the school after
finding it recruited and admitted the alleged rapist to the school even though the coach, athletics director and
president had knowledge that he had criminal and disciplinary problems, including sexually violent behavior). J.K.
v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83855 (D. Ariz. 2008) (denying summary judgment when a student
athlete was expelled, in part of sexual harassment, from a “Summer Bridge Program,” but then re-admitted to
Arizona State University as a freshman, only to be found responsible for sexually assaulting another student during
his first year on campus).
58
See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Changing Social Norms? Title IX and Legal Activism: Concluding Remarks, 31 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 407, 418 (2008).

Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand

10

Clery Act and settled with the survivor’s family for $2.5 million.59 The case eventually led to
the President, Vice President for Student Affairs and Director of Public Safety being fired,60 and
an estimated $3.8 million in total costs.61 Other large settlements include an $850,000 settlement
by Arizona State University in a case where a student was raped by a football player who had
been expelled for misconduct, including sexual harassment, but was readmitted after intervention
by the coach.62 In addition, the University of Georgia paid a six-figure settlement to a plaintiff
who was raped by several athletes, including one who the university knew had a criminal record
before he was admitted.63 In light of such large fines and settlements, it is frankly baffling to see
schools regularly acting against their clear interests in avoiding quite expensive liability. It
seems that something else is going on, and indeed it is.
As I explained in greater detail in my 2009 article, the rate of campus peer sexual
violence and the high non-reporting rate perpetuate a cycle whereby perpetrators commit sexual
violence because they think they won’t get caught or because they actually haven’t been caught.
Then, because survivors do not report the violence, perpetrators are not caught, continue to
believe they will not get caught, and continue to perpetrate. Because survivors largely do not
report due to the documented disbelieving and/or hostile reactions of others, particularly those in
authority, our first steps as campus communities and as a society should be to change these
attitudes and our procedures to encourage victims to come forward. If we are going to break the
cycle and end the violence, we need survivors to report, and we cannot expect survivors to report
unless we treat them better when they do. The existing law and the structure of school liability
that it sets up appear to recognize and support this approach.
However, when we do create better responses, and survivors begin to report the violence
as a result, a strange thing happens: the campus all of a sudden looks like it has a serious crime
problem. In fact, both national and local statistics indicate that every campus currently has this
serious crime problem at pretty much the same rate, a rate that tracks the national incidence.
However, the non-reporting phenomenon and how it is created means that the schools that are
ignoring the problem have fewer reports and look more safe, whereas the schools that encourage
victim reporting have more reports and look less safe. Appearances in this case are completely
59

See Geoff Larcom, Eastern Michigan University to Pay $350,000 in Federal Fines Over Laura Dickinson Case,
ANN ARBOR NEWS, June 6, 2008,
http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/2008/06/eastern_michigan_university_to.html.
60
See Marisa Schultz, EMU Murder Trial Begins Today, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007,
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071015/SCHOOLS/710150361/1026/LOCAL.
61
Marisa Schultz, Controversy to Cost EMU $1M, DETROIT NEWS, July 19, 2007,
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070719/SCHOOLS/707190389/1003/metro. In addition to
the Clery-related DOE investigation, the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) also
investigated EMU’s violations of Title IX and published its Letter of Finding in December of 2010. See Letter from
Catherine D. Criswell to Gloria A. Hage (undated), in Eastern Michigan University, OCR Case No. 15-09-6002,
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/15096002-a.pdf.
62
Tessa Muggeridge, ASU Settlement Ends in $850,000 Payoff, STATE PRESS, Feb. 3, 2009,
http://www.statepress.com/archive/node/4020. ASU has been sued again by a student who says she was raped by
members of a fraternity where the university knew there was a pattern of sexual violence and where suspected
mishandling of the investigation by campus police made criminal charges impossible. Kyle Patton & Joseph
Schmidt, Former Student Sues ABOR Over Sexual Assault Case, STATE PRESS, July 18, 2010,
http://www.statepress.com/2010/07/18/former-student-sues-abor-over-sexual-assault-case/.
63
See Rosenfeld, supra note 58, at 420.
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the opposite of reality, and the correct conclusion to draw from the number of reports of peer
sexual violence on a campus is entirely counterintuitive.
This disconnect between appearance and reality puts any given college or university on
the horns of a dilemma: does an institution seek to end the violence by encouraging victimreporting and otherwise drawing attention to the problem (through, for instance, mandatory
prevention-oriented programming at first-year student orientation) but risk gaining a reputation
as a dangerous campus, or does the institution ignore the problem and discourage victim
reporting either passively (through hard to navigate, confusing or simply non-existent policies
and procedures) or actively (through treating victims who report hostilely)? Add into the mix
that the campus next door or across town or one step below or above in the rankings may choose
Door Number 2 (ignore the problem), leaving a school to explain to potential and current
students and their parents why it has so much more crime than a competitor institution. It is this
information problem that creates incentives counter to those created by the liability structure of
laws such as Title IX and the Clery Act, incentives for schools not only to remain as unaware as
possible of the campus peer sexual violence problem in general and any instances of violence
happening on their campuses specifically, but also actively to avoid knowledge about both the
general problem and specific cases of violence.
Closely related to this information problem is one that underlies it. Our society continues
to hold onto many persistent myths about sexual violence. One such myth is that of the stranger
rapist. In the public imagination, a rapist is still someone who jumps a woman in a dark alley,
late at night, someone who she has never seen before and may never see again, depending on
whether he is caught. Yet the vast majority of sexual violence perpetrators are those who are
known to the victims: acquaintances, dates, friends, husbands, family members, religious
officials, employers, supervisors, and others, none of whom need to jump a woman in a dark
alley. They have access to her home, her room, her workplace. They are around her when she is
most vulnerable and when the least amount of force, if any at all, is needed to overcome her will
and lack of consent. After the violence, she is left with all of the complicated decisions about
whether to bring charges and seek justice against someone who was trusted and perhaps even
loved, and who may still be trusted and loved by others very close to the victim.
This is a much more complicated picture than the stranger rape myth, and it is just as true
on college and university campuses as in any other place. In fact, the situation may be even
more complicated on campuses. Sociologists and criminologists studying campus peer sexual
violence have used a theory called the routine activities theory to posit that sexual violence
occurs so much on college campuses because there are a surfeit of “motivated offender[s] [and]
suitable target[s] and an absence of capable guardians all converg[ing] in one time and space.”64
They suggest that all three elements must be present for there to be a significant crime problem
and the failure of schools to act as “capable guardians”65 elevates the influence of peer support to
64

Amy I. Cass, Routine Activities and Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Individual- and School-Level Factors, 22
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 350, 351(2007).
65
See Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 630. See also Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard Tewksbury, Sexual
Assault of College Women: A Feminist Interpretation of a Routine Activities Analysis, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 89, 101
(2002). Schwartz and his colleagues provide an explanation for the history and use of the routine activities theory in
explanations of criminal violence generally and sexual violence on college campuses specifically. The original
theory apparently focused almost entirely on the victims/“suitable targets,” and has been criticized for seeking to
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commit assaults on “motivated offenders.”66 In other words, sexual violence supportive cultures
can lead to higher incidences of sexual violence and the institution itself, if it is ignoring the
problem and failing to act as a “capable guardian,” is helping to create the problem. Therefore,
colleges and universities that want to be “capable guardians” and to address the campus peer
sexual violence problem are left with having not only to explain why increased reports of sexual
violence are a good thing, but also why the vast majority of campus sexual violence cannot be
addressed through better lighting, blue light phones, and police escort services. Complicated
pictures and persistent myths are particularly hard to explain in our sound-bite society.
There are still other, less central, but also important information problems exacerbating
schools’ tendencies toward passive lack of and active avoidance of knowledge. First, the vast
majority of professionals working on the front lines in residence life, student conduct, public
safety and other departments where survivors are likely to report are not lawyers and are neither
hired for nor trained in knowledge about campus peer sexual violence. Many are honestly
unaware of the basic facts of campus peer sexual violence, never mind what the law requires of
schools and school officials, yet they are the ones creating and applying the policies and
procedures, as well as responding to any reports that victims do make on campus. Moreover,
many realize that they are untrained when they are confronted with the problem and, especially if
there is no time or resources with which to educate themselves, trying to ignore or make the
problem go away may be the most attractive option.67
Second, education and efforts to combat violence against women are both notoriously
underfunded areas. This means that comprehensive training for the wide swath of personnel who
could have contact with a campus peer sexual violence survivor is often viewed by a school as
too expensive when there are so many other important matters vying for limited resources.
Responding at all, never mind adequately, to even a single report of peer sexual violence can also
require a tremendous amount of resources, and is, by its nature, going to result in at least one
very unhappy student. That student may be unhappy enough to sue or complain to the
Department of Education, an even greater resource drain. Under these circumstances, not
knowing about the violence to begin with or making a report go away as soon as possible once
again looks like a very attractive option.
II.

The Role of the Law and Legal Enforcement in Perpetuating and Exacerbating
Campus Peer Sexual Violence Information Problems

“deflect[] attention away from offenders’ motivation.” Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 625. Schwartz and various
colleagues have therefore deliberately focused on the “motivated offender” part of the equation, including by
proposing a feminist version of routine activities theory. Id. at 628. In addition, while they note that the “absence of
capable guardians” aspect of the theory’s equation is the least studied, they highlight the effect that a rapesupportive culture has on all three parts of the equation, in that it “gives men some of the social support they need…
to victimize women [while women’s] internalization of [the same culture] can contribute both to the availability of
“suitable targets” and to the lack of deterrence structures to act as effective guardianship.” Id. at 630.
66
Id. at 646.
67
Note that this characterization is made based on my nearly 15 years of experience working in various parts of
university administration, including both student and academic affairs, as well as my interactions with higher
education professionals from all over the country when I attend and present on the law related to campus peer sexual
violence at various national higher education conferences.
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At first glance, these information problems, especially the central one, seem pretty
intractable. Higher education in the United States is a competitive business, and those
institutions competing for students are overwhelmingly private entities. Even publicly-funded
state schools still compete for the best students, their tuition dollars and their future alumni
donations. A school’s reputation is critically important in such a competitive system. Although
factors such as academic reputation, curriculum and cost likely count as the most important
criteria with most students and parents,68 a reputation as a dangerous place—especially as a place
where daughters and young women are victims of rape in large numbers—must be damaging to a
school.
Indeed, the idea that potential students and parents should know about the level of
crime—especially violent crime—on a campus was a key motivator behind the Clery Act. A
primary aim of the Clery Act has to do with campus crime reporting, setting out requirements for
schools to report and publish certain categories of crime that occur on campus. Schools that
violate the Clery Act may be fined by the Department of Education (“DOE”), the largest fine to
date being the $350,000 against Eastern Michigan University mentioned above. As this case and
other cases involving large fines against schools for violating the Clery Act demonstrate, because
sexual violence is the most common form of violent crime on college campuses today,69 the
Clery Act and the issue of campus peer sexual violence have become quite important to each
other.
However, of the federal statutes that apply to campus peer sexual violence, the Clery Act
is arguably not the most important, especially with regard to protecting victims of campus peer
sexual violence. That honor belongs to Title IX, which prohibits sexual harassment in schools as
a form of sex discrimination.70 Peer sexual violence is generally considered a case of hostile
environment sexual harassment that is “so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”71 Because of the
severity of sexual violence, generally, even only a single instance of violence will be considered
hostile environment sexual harassment.72

68

The studies that have sought to measure the Clery Act’s achievement of the Clerys’ original goals, including
students’ selection of schools based on safety issues, have overall found that students and parents overwhelmingly
do not consult Clery Act statistics and/or do not use those statistics in choosing schools. Dennis E. Gregory and
Steven M. Janosik, Research on the Clery Act and ts Impact on higher Education Administrative Practice, in Bonnie
S. Fisher and John J. Sloan, III, eds., Campus Crime: Legal, Social and Policy Perspectives, 2nd Ed., 30, 60 (2007).
69
SAMPSON, supra note 5, at 1.
70
See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENT BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 2 (2001), available at:
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf [hereinafter REVISED GUIDANCE].
71
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999).
72
See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 66, at 6 (“The more severe the conduct, the less the need to show a repetitive
series of incidents; this is particularly true if the harassment is physical. For instance, if the conduct is more severe,
e.g., attempts to grab a female student’s breasts or attempts to grab any student’s genital area or buttocks, it need not
be as persistent to create a hostile environment. Indeed, a single or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if
sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment.”).
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Title IX is enforced in two ways when peer sexual violence is at issue: first, through
survivors’ private right of action against their schools73 and second, through administrative
enforcement by the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”).74 Both
enforcement jurisdictions derive from the fact that schools agree to comply with Title IX in order
to receive federal funds.75
In general, the private right of action requires a plaintiff/survivor to reach a higher
standard but, if a plaintiff can meet that standard, as suggested above, the damages that the
school could be required to pay are quite significant. While most cases settle, the settlements
give a sense of what both sides anticipate the damages awarded by a jury will be.
The OCR process is more injunctive than compensatory, so student victims complaining
to OCR will not get monetary damages. However, OCR’s approach is both more comprehensive
and more exacting than is possible in a private lawsuit, especially under the Gebser/Davis
standard. Schools can be, and often are, required to change their entire response system to peer
sexual violence and harassment, including but not limited to policies, procedures, and resource
allocations.
As one can see, particularly from cases like those at Eastern Michigan University and
University of Colorado, Title IX and the Clery Act, never mind the state laws that may apply in
any given case, set up a formidable liability scheme where non-compliance can be quite
expensive for schools. Yet damage to a school’s reputation could be even more expensive,
although in a less quantifiable way. Nevertheless, the legislative and administrative schemes
under Title IX and the Clery Act fail to address the countervailing pressures created by the
concern about public image and reputation, although for different reasons. Title IX and its
attendant enforcement regimes appear not to recognize the issue of reputation at all. Moreover,
while the Clery Act, as noted above, is very concerned with increasing information flow and
transparency about campus crime, as will be discussed in greater detail below, its approach is not
one that is well-suited to the counterintuitive effects of reporting in the campus peer sexual
violence context or to debunking the stranger-rape myth discussed above. Therefore, neither
Title IX nor the Clery Act address the counterincentives created by the information problems
discussed above. In fact, there are several ways in which they exacerbate those problems.
a. Court Enforcement of Title IX and the Actual Knowledge Test
The first way in which Title IX exacerbates the information problems and encourages
both passive unawareness and active avoidance of knowledge is through the test for school
liability for peer sexual harassment, including sexual violence. Title IX’s private right of action,
as well as the standard that a survivor must reach in order to prove that her Title IX rights were
violated, derives from the Gebser and Davis cases. The test has been developed in peer sexual
violence cases since Davis by lower courts applying the Davis precedent and can be summarized
generally as:
73

See THE EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT, ¶ 102 (Travis Hicks, ed. 2008) [hereinafter
EDUCATOR’S GUIDE].
74
See id. ¶ 321.
75
See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 66, at 2-3.
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1)
2)

3)
4)

The school is a recipient of federal funding76
The sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational
opportunities or benefits provided by the school,77
The school had actual knowledge/notice of the harassment,78
The school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment,79

The precedent that has developed under the fourth, “deliberate indifference” prong was
the focus of my 2009 article, where my overall conclusion was that it was as robust as a
deliberate indifference standard can be. However, a look at the full corpus of cases shows that
many cases never make it to the fourth prong of the test. Too many are thrown out as a result of
the third prong, requiring that a plaintiff show that the school had actual knowledge or notice of
the harassment.
Others have written on this problem, including several dissenting Supreme Court Justices
in Gebser and Davis, so I will mainly summarize their analysis briefly and update it based on
what has actually occurred since the late 1990s. Two main difficulties have emerged from the
case law, and a third occurs as a result of pure logic as well as actual experience.
First, the actual knowledge prong requires that the school has actual knowledge of the
harassment, begging the question of who represents the school. There is significant variation on
this question. In some cases, especially ones where the harasser is a teacher or school official, if
only another teacher or school official of equal rank has knowledge of the harassment, courts
have found this knowledge to be insufficient to qualify as knowledge by the school.80 Courts are
more open to allowing teachers to count as the school in peer sexual harassment cases,81 but this
is not guaranteed82 and others who would seem to be in similar positions of authority as teachers,
such as bus drivers,83 coaches,84 and school “paraprofessionals,”85 have been judged to be

76

S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. See also Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000); Soper v. Hoben, 195
F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Linda Wharton, Comments from the Spring 2007 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender Conference Held at Harvard
Law School (Megan Ryan, ed.), 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 378, 387 (2008).
81
Soriano ex rel. Garcia v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 2004 WL 2397610, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2004);
Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1099 (D. Minn. 2000); Morlock v. West Cent.
Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908 (D. Minn. 1999); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 644 (W.D.
Pa. 2005) (overruled on other grounds).
82
Peer v. Porterfield, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1380, at *28-30 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (stating notice must be to an
“official … capable of terminating or suspending the individual” – held to apply to principal but not necessarily
teachers); M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, at *25-26 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that
actual knowledge did not exist until assistant principal was informed, even though other school officials were
previously aware of the incident).
83
Staehling v. Metro. Gov’t, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, at *28-31 (M.D. Tenn 2008).
84
Halvorson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-007, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96445, at *6 (W.D. Okla. 2008). But see Roe ex
rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1029-34 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
85
Noble v. Branch Intermediate Sch. Dist., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600, at *39-47 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
77
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“inappropriate persons.” This leads to confusing variation,86 requiring survivors to know and
parse through school hierarchies in specific and diverse contexts based on the identities of the
perpetrators and the relationships between the person with knowledge and the harasser.
Second, variation has emerged as to what kind of knowledge constitutes actual
knowledge. If a school is aware of a student’s harassment of other students besides the victim
who is reporting in a given case, must the school have actual knowledge of the harassment
experienced by that particular victim? Courts have resolved the issue in different ways.87 In a
review of the peer harassment cases where this question was posed, they are fairly evenly split
between courts that find that the school must have actual knowledge of the harassment
experienced by the particular survivor bringing the case, those that state that the school’s
knowledge of the peer harasser’s previous harassment of other victims is sufficient to meet the
actual knowledge standard, and ambiguous decisions.88 While the Circuit Court cases are all in
the second and third categories (no knowledge of specific victim required or ambiguous), few
cases appear to get appealed beyond the district court, and this review shows that the district
courts are all over the place in terms of their decisions on this issue.
The number of district courts that find actual knowledge of harassment of a specific
victim is necessary is doubly surprising because it suggests a certain acceptance of victimblaming attitudes by some courts. A belief that the identity of the victim of harassing behavior is
relevant to whether the school is obligated to respond to the harassment focuses the school or
court on the victim’s and not the perpetrator’s behavior, suggesting that some victims must do
something that invites the harassment, whereas other victims are “blameless.” Indeed, if a
perpetrator is known to have harassed or assaulted multiple victims, this should suggest that the
victim’s identity and behavior are not relevant, because the perpetrator himself does not find the
identity of the victim relevant.
The Simpson case provides a more specific example of the range of court reasoning on
this issue. In that case, the Tenth Circuit denied the university’s summary judgment motion on
86

Wharton, supra note 76, at 388.
Id. at 388-89.
88
Of sixteen cases where this question was dealt with directly or indirectly, six resulted in the court not requiring
actual knowledge of harassment involving a specific victim. See Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist.,
678 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1029-34 (E.D. Cal. 2009), Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t, 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 915-16 (M.D. Tenn.
2009), Staehling v. Metro. Gov't, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, at *28-31 (M.D. Tenn 2008), J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of
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Appx. 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2004), Murrell v. Denver Public Schs., 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999), Simpson v.
Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
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the basis that the university “sanctioned, supported, even funded”89 a football recruiting program
where the risk of peer sexual violence occurring was so obvious that the school’s failure to
address it constituted deliberate indifference.90 In denying the university’s motion for summary
judgment, the Court found that the football coach “maintained an unsupervised player-host
program to show high-school recruits ‘a good time’” despite knowing generally “of the serious
risk of sexual harassment and assault during college-football recruiting efforts; … that such
assaults had indeed occurred during CU recruiting visits; … [and] that there had been no change
in atmosphere since” the last assault.91
However, the district court that decided the case had found that the actual knowledge
standard had not been met because some three to seven prior incidents of sexual harassment and
assault (the plaintiffs alleged seven and the court found that the university had notice of three)
only proved that “some players, and some recruits, had engaged in sexual harassment and sexual
assault,” but not that they put the university “on notice of a risk that CU football players and
recruits would sexually assault female University students as part of the recruiting program,
including the risk that those assaults would be aided or exacerbated by excessive alcohol use by
players, recruits, and female students.”92 Thus, the district court in Simpson seemed to believe
that the actual knowledge requirement is not met until the school was able to predict with
clairvoyant accuracy that exactly what did happen in the case would happen.
The 10th Circuit’s decision in Simpson, as well as the Arizona State University case and
the 11 Circuit decision in Williams v. Bd. of Regents provide some hope for the future that
actual knowledge will be defined by courts in a broader sense. However, there is still significant
variation among courts, and the idea that even facts as egregious as those in Simpson could be
seen as being insufficient to establish actual knowledge by the district court means that there is
still a good chance that schools with knowledge of a serious sexual violence problem among its
students will not be held liable. Given what we know about the factors that contribute to the
incidence of campus peer sexual violence, especially the role that male peer support can play in
encouraging some male students who may not otherwise have become offenders to perpetrate
sexual violence,93 the idea of knowledge used by the 10th Circuit in Simpson is much closer to
reality than that used by the Simpson district court. That is, research shows that campus cultures
that are sexual violence-supportive contribute to individual cases of peer sexual violence, and the
law should therefore create incentives for schools both to understand this insight and to act upon
it. The current confusion over what constitutes actual knowledge at best does not send this clear
message and at worst creates incentives in exactly the opposite direction.
th

This brings the discussion around to the final problem with the actual knowledge
standard. The standard that the Gebser Court created but did not define was not the only choice
of standard. In fact, the plaintiff, many amici and the Department of Education either advocated
or actually used a constructive knowledge standard, which asks whether the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that a risk of harassment existed. Such a standard creates
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incentives for schools to set up mechanisms likely to flush out and address harassment, since
there is a substantial risk that a court will decide that the school “should have known” about the
harassment anyway. In addition, the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in the sexual
harassment in employment cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), caused many employers to adopt sexual
harassment policies and procedures.94 Employers did so because if they had such policies and
procedures in place, but a plaintiff failed to use them, the employer had a defense against liability
for the harassment.95
These are not the incentives created by the actual knowledge standard. Rather, the actual
knowledge standard, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent to Gebser, encourages schools to
avoid knowledge rather than set up procedures by which survivors can easily report.96 After all,
if schools can avoid knowledge, then they need not respond, and a court will not evaluate
whether they acted with deliberate indifference. Justice Stevens’ dissent was in part a response
to the Court’s suggestion that the actual knowledge standard is designed to “avoid diverting
education funding from beneficial uses where a [school] was unaware of discrimination in its
programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures.”97 A decade plus of experience
with the actual knowledge standard demonstrates that Justice Stevens had it right and that
schools are not “willing to institute prompt corrective measures.” In fact, as already noted, doing
nothing at all is both the school response of choice and the response that is most likely to qualify
as a violation of a different prong of the same review standard. Unlike with the Faragher/Ellerth
approach, there has not been a rush to develop policies, procedures and training on sexual
harassment among schools as there has been with employers. As Professor David Wolitz asked
at a workshop where I presented my 2009 paper, “I remember this issue getting a lot of attention
when I was in college in the 1990s. Why has nothing changed since then?” Experience now
proves what common sense and Justice Stevens suggested 12 years ago: the problem will persist
until schools start making sure that they have knowledge about what is actually occurring among
their students, and they will not acquire that knowledge until the law requires them to do so, or at
least until the law does not encourage them to do the opposite.
b. Problems with Administrative Enforcement of Title IX
The good news is that the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights does use a
constructive knowledge standard when it investigates schools for violations of Title IX in peer
sexual harassment cases. The bad news is that very few people know how to initiate an
investigation and almost no one knows about the results of those investigations. In addition,
OCR’s proactive guidance, which is easily available to the general public, is relatively vague.
This particular information problem compromises the effectiveness of OCR’s school regulation
quite broadly and contributes to both passive unawareness and active avoidance of awareness on
the part of schools. Although the current administration is making admirable efforts to change
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this situation by issuing a recent Dear Colleague Letter (DCL)98 and posting the results of recent
investigations in OCR’s electronic reading room,99 these efforts are limited in comparison with
the scope of the problem.
OCR enforcement generally takes place as a result of a complaint being filed regarding a
school’s response to a sexual harassment case, which causes OCR to undertake a fairly
comprehensive investigation of that school’s response system.100 This investigation often
includes a close review of institutional policies and procedures, as well as the steps the school
took to resolve a complaint101 and files relating to past sexual harassment cases that required a
school to respond in some way.102 OCR also interviews those involved in the case, particularly
relevant school personnel.103 OCR cases are generally resolved through a “letter of finding”
(“LOF”) addressed to the school and written by OCR, which is sometimes accompanied by a
“commitment to resolve” (“CTR”) signed by the school.104 Even when OCR does not find a
school in violation of Title IX or its regulations, it may find “technical violations” in its policies
or procedures and require a school to make changes to those policies as directed by OCR.105
Once a case is resolved, OCR takes no further action besides monitoring any agreement it may
have made with the school.106
The comprehensiveness and strictness, relative to the Gebser/Davis standard, of OCR’s
approach makes it potentially a very useful tool to get schools to respond properly to peer sexual
violence. In addition to the use of the constructive knowledge standard, OCR’s approach is
injunctive, forward-looking, and directly changes school behavior for the future, whereas a
private suit for damages at best will only make such changes indirectly, perhaps through a
settlement where the plaintiff insists on changes or because the school learns its lesson and
makes changes to avoid a repeat violation. In addition, because of their comprehensiveness,
OCR’s investigations look at a school’s system at a very detailed level and require changes at a
similar level of detail. In part because the deliberate indifference standard only reaches the worst
school behaviors but also because this is not the typical role of courts, private lawsuits under
Title IX are unlikely to reach the level of detail that are regular parts of the OCR process.
This level of detailed review and guidance is much-needed on the ground at most
schools. For the front-line educational administrators and professionals actually dealing with
cases of peer sexual violence, the devil is often in the details. When one student sexually
assaults another student in the same dorm, which student should the school move out of the dorm
while the school is investigating the case? What standard of proof should the student code of
conduct adopt in adjudications of such cases and can or should it be different from the standard
98
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used for other conduct code violations (e.g. plagiarism)? What is the scope of the school’s
obligations to protect the students’ confidentiality, especially when there is ambiguity and/or a
potential conflict in the regulations? Can a school issue a stay away order between students
where an official charge under the student code of conduct has not been filed? Can a school
require, encourage or allow mediation of sexual harassment or violence cases? Should a
survivor be allowed to appeal a hearing board decision in a student conduct case and, if so, what
access to evidence, the transcript of the hearing and any written basis of the judgment should she
have? These are just some of the questions that come up regularly for the “first responders” and
policymakers at schools.
These are also questions that do not show up in most Title IX lawsuits or in OCR’s 2001
proactive guidance107 on how to respond to peer sexual harassment and violence. Moreover,
while the DCL has made a good start at answering a number of these questions, it does not
answer them all, and the nature of individual cases is that new questions are sure to arise.
However, many of these issues have been investigated and resolved by OCR in its investigations.
Therefore, having access to OCR’s LOFs could resolve many of these questions for the people
who really need such answers.
1. Lack of a well-publicized complaint procedure
Despite how helpful they could be to both survivors and campus policymakers and
administrators, neither information about the complaint procedure nor the results of those
investigations are particularly accessible or well-publicized. In the case of OCR complaints,
while information is posted on the OCR website,108 this is the only place that it seems to appear.
Even OCR’s own guidance and the recent DCL, while referring to OCR investigations,109 never
explain how one would go about initiating an investigation or where one might file a
complaint.110 While it is clear that the main audience for the guidance is schools, the guidance
obviously is likely to be read by a wider swath of the general public than just the regulated
entities. In addition, at no place on the OCR websites dealing with the complaint process is
sexual harassment mentioned, so these pages are not terribly easy to find through simple internet
searching. The Center for Public Integrity’s series on campus sexual violence confirms that “few
students know they have the right to complain” and “the number of investigations into sexual
assault-related cases is ‘shockingly low.’”111
2. Violations of the Freedom of Information Act
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Still, the two websites devoted to the OCR complaint process look like a no-holds-barred
publicity campaign compared to the publicly available information devoted to OCR’s resolutions
of the complaints that are filed. In fact, the only way that anyone other than a complainant or the
school being investigated can see the resolution of most cases is through filing a Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) request. If one wishes to see various OCR Letters of Finding but one
does not know which ones in particular one needs to see, one must file a blanket FOIA request
for all of the LOFs in a particular timeframe, against a particular school, or similar. With the
exception of a couple of recent cases,112 the letters are not available in the DOE public FOIA
reading room.
The DOE’s own regulations implementing FOIA state that the agency will keep in its
public reading room: “final opinions and orders in adjudications… and copies of all agency
records regardless of form or format released to the public pursuant to a FOIA request that the
Department determines are likely to be the subject of future FOIA requests.”113 “Adjudications”
is undefined by the regulations, but even if OCR’s “final opinions and orders” in its complaint
investigations are not strictly adjudications, they almost certainly fit into the category of “agency
records… released to the public pursuant to a FOIA request… likely to be the subject of future
FOIA requests.” While it is true that DOE must determine that a particular, already released
record is likely to be requested again, in this case, several bits of evidence indicate that at least
some LOFs have been requested multiple times and yet there is a continuing categorical
exclusion of these LOFs from the DOE public reading room. This evidence includes the fact that
the Center for Public Integrity filed a blanket FOIA request for OCR sexual harassment
investigations from 1998-2008.114 In addition, I have filed FOIA requests for a series of LOFs in
OCR cases, cases about which I was aware through a publication called The Educator’s Guide to
Controlling Sexual Harassment.115 This publication files blanket FOIA requests, then
synopsizes the cases involving new or unique legal points, facts and/or conclusions. Therefore,
there is a group of LOFs that not only are “likely to be the subject of future FOIA requests” but
actually have been requested multiple times.116 Combined with the fact that The Educator’s
Guide’s summaries of OCR cases increases the likelihood that they will be requested, it seems
clear that the DOE would see this as proof that the LOFs are “likely to be the subject of future
FOIA requests.”
As already mentioned, absent making the LOFs available in the public reading room, the
only way a member of the public can read the LOFs is through filing a FOIA request. Again
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according to its own regulations, DOE has 20 working days (i.e. a little under a month) after the
request is received by the appropriate office to “determine whether to comply with the
request.”117 However, in “unusual circumstances,” this time period may be extended to a time
“arrange[d] with the Department… within which the FOIA request will be processed.”118
“Unusual circumstances” include “[t]he need to search for and collect the requested agency
records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing
the request.”119 Since OCR investigations are conducted by local enforcement offices,120
“unusual circumstances” are in fact usual circumstances and put all FOIA requests related to
OCR’s investigations in the category where there is no definite deadline for the DOE’s response
and it must be “arrange[d] with the Department.” 121 It is therefore impossible to know how
quickly or how slowly a FOIA request might be fulfilled, and there is room for it to be quite slow
indeed.
Based on this evidence, it appears that DOE is engaging in a systemic FOIA violation,
one which virtually eliminates a method that could alleviate one of the information problems
discussed above: the lack of awareness of the non-lawyer first responders and policymakers at
many schools. Such front-line staff might find the time to search files in a public FOIA reading
room to see if the DOE has ever investigated a complaint that might throw light on the school’s
own particular policy or implementation question. However, they are not going to take the
months and the amount of labor it would take to file and receive results from a blanket FOIA
request that might not even contain a case that is on point.
3. (Suspicions of) Inadequate and Inconsistent Investigations and
Piecemeal Enforcement in Student Complaint Cases
Several other information problems occur as a result of the systemic FOIA violation in
which DOE is engaging, including a general lack of accountability for OCR and piecemeal
enforcement of Title IX’s requirements. First, the lack of transparency regarding OCR’s
investigations makes it extremely difficult to check those investigations for consistency or
adequacy. From the few cases I have seen, I have already noticed significant variation between
regions in terms of their findings in peer sexual violence cases and suspect that these might have
to do, in part, with the quality of the investigations conducted. For instance, when University of
California at Santa Cruz was investigated in 1994, the investigation clearly involved a wide
swath of people on campus, not only those officials who had dealt with the case.122 Yet in other
investigations, there is evidence that OCR never attempted to speak with anyone but the
complainant and the school officials being investigated.123 Such investigations unsurprisingly
often result in “complainant said, defendant school said” situations where ultimately OCR finds
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that there was “insufficient evidence” to support the complainant’s allegations.124 Third party
evidence might have broken such a stalemate, had OCR sought to speak to third parties.
As mentioned above, the Center for Public Integrity undertook the kind of review that
would be next to impossible for most schools or advocates to accomplish; it did a blanket FOIA
request for 11 years worth of OCR Title IX investigations (1998-2008), and found 24
investigations (out of 210 campus sex discrimination investigations) into “allegations that
colleges and universities botched sexual assault cases.”125 Only 5 of these found the schools
responsible for violating Title IX, and in some cases OCR didn’t find violations for some pretty
serious school behavior. For instance, although OCR’s own guidance makes clear that
retaliation by the school against a survivor for reporting an assault is a violation of Title IX,126
when Boston University “distributed a press packet with information about an alleged rape
victim, noting that she was fined for “disorderly conduct” and drinking alcohol on the night she
was allegedly raped,”127 OCR did not find the school in violation of Title IX. In contrast, the
U.C. Santa Cruz investigation found violations of Title IX due to “unclear information about sex
offense policies, poor recordkeeping and inconsistent disciplinary procedures.” In the primary
investigation discussed by CPI, moreover, OCR accepted a series of the University of
Wisconsin’s excuses for why it delayed addressing a student’s report of sexual assault, including
that the school had put its process on hold because a criminal investigation was occurring.128
This was despite the clear statement in OCR’s own guidance that “Police investigations or
reports… do not relieve the school of its duty to respond promptly and effectively.”129 Such
disparate findings raise real questions about how consistent OCR’s enforcement is, but the
systemic FOIA violation makes it nearly impossible to check the accuracy of such suspicions.
In addition, both the FOIA violation and the underlying questions about the quality and
consistency of the investigations themselves lead to a situation of piecemeal enforcement where
some schools are being held to a higher standard than others. For instance, prior to the recent
DSL, which clarifies that this rule applies to all schools, only schools that had been investigated
had been required to adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard for school hearings of peer
sexual violence cases.130 Nothing about a preponderance of the evidence standard appears in the
Revised Guidance, so this appeared to be a requirement that OCR had developed through its
investigations, despite OCR’s disclaimer on its website that “Letters of findings are not formal
statements of OCR policy and they should not be relied upon, cited, or construed as such.”131
Although the DSL has now alleviated this problem, this could have presented a separate problem
under the Freedom of Information Act, which states, in the section on public reading rooms, that:
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A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or
instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as
precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if-(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by
this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.132
Therefore, to the extent that DOE relies in its enforcement actions on precedents developed in
past investigations but neither publishes the Letters of Finding from those investigations nor
integrates those precedents into its guidance, it could be violating FOIA once again.
This piecemeal enforcement has several consequences. First, schools are not being
treated the same, with schools that have been investigated and those that have not being treated
differently, but possibly those schools who have been investigated also potentially being treated
differently from each other. This is hardly fair to schools, and it is entirely possible that part of
the reason why different schools are being held to different standards has to do with how well
some schools negotiate versus how well some offices or administrations of OCR negotiate. This
is because of the structure of OCR enforcement, which seeks voluntary compliance because
OCR has no ability to do less than withhold federal funds for a violation of Title IX. It has no
ability to fine a school, for instance, or to take other punitive measures short of the “nuclear
option” represented by withholding federal funds.133 Since the comfort level with using OCR’s
nuclear option seems about the same as the United States’ and Soviet Union’s during the Cold
War,134 essentially OCR is left to negotiate a settlement with schools with all of the damage to its
negotiating position that an empty threat can do. This leads to uneven enforcement.
It also exacerbates the central information problem discussed in part one of this article:
the idea that colleges and universities are in a kind of competition with each other with regard to
their public images and the reporting of sexual violence on campus. Because enforcement of
Title IX is not uniform, some schools are able to get away with adopting policies more likely to
suppress—or at least not encourage—victim reporting. Only the schools that have been
investigated are compelled to come into compliance with Title IX and respond in a fashion that is
likely to increase reporting, as the overall Title IX liability scheme encourages. Given 1) how
few people are even aware of the complaint process, 2) the possibility that OCR will not insist on
full compliance even if a school is investigated, and 3) the virtual guarantee that OCR will never
take any money away from the school anyway, it seems much less costly to gamble that one
might be investigated and found to have violated Title IX than to risk looking like a dangerous
campus.
4. Lack of Proactive Enforcement
When interviewed by the Center for Public Integrity, the Deputy Head of Enforcement
during the George W. Bush administration attempted to justify many of the enforcement
inadequacies listed above by saying that investigations are less effective than the behind-the132
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scenes “technical assistance” and other proactive methods adopted by OCR to get schools to
come into compliance.135 However, he also noted that the Revised Guidance published by the
Clinton Administration on one of its last days in office was shelved immediately and not
followed by the subsequent administration, although it was not publicly rescinded nor were
advocates and others aware of its “shelved” status.136 In addition, as CPI also notes, OCR’s
budget and staff were cut over the course of the Bush Administration, despite an increase in
complaints to be investigated, impacting the office’s ability to provide both proactive guidance
and technical assistance.137
Evidence such as the DCL, other Dear Colleague Letters, particularly the one on the
application of Title IX to bullying,138 and the posting of recent compliance reviews and
complaint resolutions in the reading room show that the Obama administration is thankfully
taking enforcement much more seriously., Nevertheless, there are still significant deficiencies in
the proactive steps that OCR takes. First, it is not clear whether the “technical assistance”
mentioned by the former Deputy Head of Enforcement was allocated to schools other than those
being investigated and if this was the case, whether that has changed under the current
administration. Therefore, this method cannot qualify as a purely proactive or preventative
approach—if anything, it is designed to prevent recidivism.
Second, as already noted, the Revised Guidance, whether shelved or not, is quite general
and leaves many of the detailed questions that educational administrators have unanswered. The
DCL has made a good start and helpfully clarified a number of hitherto ambiguous issues, but
much of both the 2001 and the DCL’s guidance is not bright-line-rule-oriented, an approach
which is more difficult for non-lawyers to apply, and with which they are often uncomfortable.
It also allows more room for schools to apply the rules in a way that is arguably not in violation
of the letter but clearly in violation of the spirit of Title IX. For instance, the Revised Guidance
calls for “prompt and equitable” processes to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred,
but says nothing about the myriad questions that can arise as to what is “equitable.” If a school
holds hearings to determine whether sexual violence occurred, for instance, and gives the
accused student the right to appeal, what are the complaining student’s appeal rights? The DCL
does establish that any disciplinary procedure giving the accused student the right to an appeal
must also give that right to the complaining student, but it does not say anything about the scope
of that right. Does she get equal access to a full transcript of the hearing, any evidence submitted
and considered, any opinion written by the hearing board explaining their decision, etc.? These
questions are still unaddressed and leave open the possibility for a school not to allow such
procedural rights for the complaining student, despite the clear non-equitable slant of such a
decision, just because there is no explicit directive that schools take these steps. Even a
statement such as “when in doubt, a school should provide any right (in its full scope) that it
gives to an accused student to a complaining student” would be extremely helpful, but neither the
Revised Guidance nor the DCL contain such a statement.
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Finally, although the Obama administration does appear to be taking a more proactive
approach, there are still relatively few attempts on the part of OCR to engage in any proactive
enforcement such as random compliance reviews. This means that nearly the entire burden of
enforcement falls on those who file complaints, most likely the survivors of the sexual violence,
who may be too worn out to complain, given that they have not only been through the
traumatizing violence itself, but likely a re-victimizing school process (else, why would they
complain?). This structure is therefore unlikely to alter the risk-benefit analysis of a school that
would rather risk being investigated and found to have violated Title IX than to risk looking like
a dangerous campus.
c. Campus Crime Reporting Requirements and the Unrealized Solution of the
Clery Act
The ultimate audience about whom schools are concerned when they face the dilemma of
encouraging victim reporting but looking like a dangerous campus is potential/current students
and their parents. Therefore, if the understandable lack of awareness of this audience could be
alleviated, this could influence a school to address the school’s own unawareness, as well as
reduce incentives for schools to actively avoid knowledge and generally not discourage schools
from adopting effective campus peer sexual violence response systems. In fact, this was at least
in part the motivation behind the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act.
The Clery Act was spearheaded by the parents of Jeanne Clery, a Lehigh first year
student who was raped and murdered by a fellow student while she was sleeping in her dorm
room.139 The primary purpose of the Act was to increase transparency around campus crime so
that prospective students and their parents could make more knowledgeable decisions about
which schools to attend. Rep. Gooding, who sponsored the bill in the House, stated that:
“The assumption behind these bills is that making this information
available will help students decide which institution to attend, will
encourage students to take security precautions while on campus, and will
encourage higher education institutions to pay careful attention to security
considerations.”140
As such, Clery’s original vision, while not specifically designed for this purpose, could have
gone a long way towards fixing the central information problem and dilemma faced by schools
regarding encouraging reporting versus public image. Unfortunately, the criteria by which Clery
requires schools to count crime, as well as the discretion that the statute gives schools and its
lack of strict, comprehensive and proactive enforcement, have prevented it from reaching its
potential in this regard.
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Security on Campus, Jeanne Clery and the SOC Story,
http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=126&Itemid=71 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2011).
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According to the 2005 Handbook for Campus Crime Reporting,141 institutions are
required to report crimes based on four factors: 1) where the crime occurred; 2) the type of
crime; 3) to whom the crime was reported; and 4) when the crime was reported.142 Reporting
requirements split university locales into three categories: on campus (including residence halls),
non-campus and public property.143 Criminal acts must be reported in three categories: type of
crime (homicide, sex offenses, forcible and non-forcible, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
motor vehicle theft, and arson),144 arrests or disciplinary actions related to liquor law violations,
drug law violations, and illegal weapons possession,145 and hate crimes.146 All reported crimes
are defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook
(UCR), not local or state law definitions.147 A crime is considered “reported” — and thus
necessary for the school to disclose — if it is brought to the attention of a “campus security
authority” or the local police.148 Notably, “campus security authority” does not include faculty,
campus physicians, or counselors (mental health, professional and pastoral).149 Finally,
institutions are instructed to include an incident in its statistics under the year in which it was
reported, not the year the incident took place.150
Institutions are required to disclose all reported crimes, regardless of whether these
reports led to investigations or disciplinary actions,151 and regardless of whether the survivor
chooses to file an official police report or press charges.152 In addition, it is immaterial whether
or not the perpetrator or survivor is associated with the school.153 A crime is considered to be
“reported” if it is “brought to the attention of a campus security authority or the local police by a
victim, witness, other third party, or even the offender.”154 Institutions are prohibited from

141

Please note that the handbook was updated in February 2011. However, most of the citations in this section still
refer to the 2005 version because this was the version in place when the crime reports examined in this article were
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be included.
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including personal identifying information about the victim or perpetrator of any reported
crimes.155
A review of school reports demonstrates significant differences between reports. Often,
schools do not report in the third category (to whom a report was made), even though it is
required.156 In addition, there is ample discretion given to schools in defining the boundaries of
the first category. Both providing a map showing the boundaries used and updating campus
boundary definitions on an annual basis are encouraged, but not required.157 There is no
automatic review process of these boundaries — an institution’s geographic definitions will only
be reviewed if a complaint is brought.158 Finally, there is variation in whether schools include
statistics gathered from local police. Institutions are expected to contact local law enforcement
agencies to obtain statistics and compile them with university statistics.159 However, the
institution is only expected to make a good faith effort in obtaining local law enforcement
statistics, a vagary that may result in different outcomes for schools in the same jurisdiction.160
If local law enforcement statistics are not broken down in a way that identifies the specific
geographic area the crime occurred in, making officials unable to determine if the crime took
place within Clery boundaries, the institution is not obligated to include law enforcement
statistics and is advised to provide a statement indicating that police statistics did not comport
with Clery reporting requirements.161 Similarly, if the local law enforcement agency does not
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comply with the institution’s request (it is not required to do so under Clery), the institution
needs to document this, but do no more.162
Even in terms of Clery’s central and original purpose, giving potential students and their
parents ways to evaluate the safety of a given campus, the variation that comes from the ample
discretion given to schools, and the lack of proactive enforcement makes meaningful
comparisons between schools difficult. Schools can minimize the crimes that they count by
using their discretion in such areas as drawing the boundaries of the various locations in which
they have to report and gathering statistics from local police. In addition, like with OCR’s
enforcement of Title IX and despite the efforts of the organization created by the Clerys, Security
on Campus, Inc., there is little knowledge of the complaint procedure and few complaints.163
This lack of awareness, combined with the lack of proactive compliance reviews by the
Department of Education, means that schools are rarely held accountable for violations.
However, when it comes to sexual violence, the Clery Act suffers from a more
fundamental problem: a definition of campus safety and security that draws from a tort-based
concept of landlord liability and territorial control, rather than a definition that is centered on a
school’s responsibilities to its students. Underlying this definition is a concept of crime that does
not fit what we know about campus peer sexual violence and in fact plays into the persistent
myth of the stranger rapist. A statute that holds a school responsible for safety and security on
the basis of territorial control assumes that a school can protect students from crime through its
control of facilities such as campus lighting (no dark alleys for those stranger rapists to hide) and
number of blue light phones (to get police protection when fleeing the stranger rapist). In light
of where, how and at whose hands most campus sexual violence occurs, counting crime based on
territorial and facilities control is unlikely to capture the full extent of the crime—at least of the
sex crimes—happening among the student body. As demonstrated above, the territorial
approach is also a lot less simple to understand and allows a lot more room for manipulation
through various territorial boundaries and definitions.
In fact, an amendment proposed to the Senate version of the Clery Act would have
required universities to report all crimes against students regardless of whether they were
committed on college campuses.164 However, the amendment was dropped when the Senate and
House versions were reconciled. The original House sponsor, Rep. Gooding, explained the
rejection in a manner demonstrating that his concept of campus security and crime suffered from
the stranger rapist myth: “Considering the fact that our goal is to provide students with
information on crimes on their campus, the inclusion of all information on crimes against
students would have skewed the data reported to students in such a manner that they would never
know if their school’s security system was effective in protecting students.”165 He also stated,
with regard to another part of Clery, which requires schools to send out timely campus warnings
about crime, that “[i]t is unconscionable that a woman can be raped on a college campus and
162
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steps are not taken to warn female students and faculty members so they can take steps to assure
they do not become the next victim.”166 Obviously, these comments contemplate mainly
warnings about stranger rapists (e.g. “a rape occurred in the northwestern corner of the Quad at
2am this morning; the suspect was described as such and such and is still at large”), since
warning about acquaintance rapists would require including the kind of information that would
identify the survivor and/or suspect both exactly and unnecessarily for purposes of capture (e.g.
“a rape occurred in Old North dormitory, room X, at 2am this morning”).
Other aspects of the Clery Act also show its deficiencies in capturing campus peer sexual
violence in campus crime statistics. The exception of all faculty and counselors from the
definition of “campus security authority” demonstrates a lack of understanding of the people to
whom sexual violence survivors tend to talk first and often at all.167 While it is possible to
defend this exception on the basis that survivors might be dissuaded from talking to these people
if they had to pass along the report, it should be noted that Clery requires schools to collect
numbers only, in very general categories, and prohibits schools from including in their reports
any personal identifying information about the victim or perpetrator of any reported crimes.168
Many counselors report such numbers for various purposes, without running afoul of the
confidentiality requirements of their professions.169
In another somewhat baffling and disturbing counting rule, under the Clery Act,
homicide, sex offenses and assault are counted as one offense per victim170 — meaning if there
are multiple perpetrators and/or multiple violations involved, such as in a gang rape, the incident
is still only counted once. In contrast, robbery, burglary and arson are counted as one offense per
distinct incident,171 motor vehicle theft is counted as one offense per stolen vehicle,172 and arson
and hate crimes are reported alongside the other most serious offense in the incident173 (e.g. an
assault that qualified as a hate crime would be counted as one assault and one hate crime). That
the rules for counting crime would not require a gang-rape to be counted for every separate
violation, especially in a context that is distressingly well-known for the gang-rape
phenomenon,174 is bizarre at best and appalling at worst. It is not only a symbolic insult to the
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survivor of gang-rape, but also provides less incentive to schools to address the gang-rape
phenomenon. After all, if a school must only report one sex offense as opposed to ten or even
five, what additional incentive does the crime reporting structure really give to schools to take
gang-rape seriously?
It appears that this counting rule has its origin in the FBI’s UCR Handbook.175 The UCR
Handbook also defines forcible sex offenses as “carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and
against her will,”176 with the further definition of carnal knowledge as “the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman; sexual intercourse” and the specification that there is
carnal knowledge if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female (vagina)
by the sexual organ of the male (penis).177 Although the Clery Act regulations allow schools to
use either the UCR Handbook or the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
version of the UCR Handbook,178 which uses “person” instead of woman,179 depending on which
version a school uses, this definition could mean that all male victims of sexual violence are
made completely invisible and that sexual violence that does not involve acts that can be
characterized as “sexual bodily connections” or attempted “sexual bodily connections” need not
be reported, despite how equally violating they might be. Although the Clery Act presumably
stays away from state law sex offenses definitions for consistency purposes, considering the
amount of reform that has gone into defining sex offenses under state laws,180 nearly any one of
those definitions seems like it would be preferable to these disturbingly antiquated ones.
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In light of all of these problems, it is no wonder that the Clery Act has not fulfilled its
promise for improving our knowledge of what is happening at most schools, never mind solving
the dilemma of whether to risk looking like a dangerous campus by encouraging victim
reporting. Even if it had avoided allowing schools too much discretion to minimize reporting if
they wish to do so (and it should be noted that some schools do not in fact appear to be
minimizing reporting—some might even be characterized as maximizing reporting), the ways
that it counts crime demonstrates fundamental misunderstandings about how campus peer sexual
violence operates. And because campus peer sexual violence “is the most common violent crime
on American college campuses today,”181 to be at all accurate, the Clery Act must structure its
rules to represent campus peer sexual violence correctly.
III.

Recommendations

In light of the series of information problems discussed in Part II, a whole list of changes
is needed if the laws dealing with campus peer sexual violence are going to eliminate the
counterincentives to the overall liability scheme’s support of institutional responses that
encourage victim reporting. The adoption of these changes could go a long way to eliminating
incentives for schools to remain passively unaware and actively avoid knowledge of campus peer
sexual violence. It could likewise discourage schools from doing anything that might keep
potential students and parents uninformed.
a. Adopt a constructive knowledge approach in Title IX private law suits.
A dozen years of Title IX litigation under Gebser and Davis have shown that the actual
knowledge standard simply does not create incentives for schools to respond adequately to peer
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish
sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the following
circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force
or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on
the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in the future
against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to
execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, "to retaliate" includes threats of physical
punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or
for purposes that are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable.
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to overcome the
victim … .
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (2011). It should be noted that other provisions of Michigan’s penal code hold that
the victim need not resist. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520i 20110. The Illinois statute holds:
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable
to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent … .
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13 (2011).
181
SAMPSON, supra note 5, at 1.
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sexual violence. Gebser and Davis have not even encouraged schools to pass policies or
establish effective procedures for addressing campus peer sexual violence and harassment and
encouraging victim reporting, changes that the Faragher/Ellerth decisions have at least arguably
achieved in terms of employer behavior. Unsurprisingly, very little progress has been made in
preventing and ending campus peer sexual violence. As a result, we are now left with the unjust
result that children and young people with fewer resources to deal with sexual harassment and
violence are less protected at their schools, where their attendance for at least the early years is
compulsory, than their adult parents are at their non-compulsory workplaces. In addition, little
progress has been made in establishing a legislative fix, as invited by the Court in Gebser. The
proposed 2008 Civil Rights Act sadly died in committee.182 In light of the litigation experience
over the last decade plus and the current failure of Congress to change these unjust results, it is
time either for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Gebser and Davis and adopt a
constructive knowledge approach to Title IX sexual harassment cases or for Congress to reintroduce and pass legislation similar to the 2008 Civil Rights Act.
b. Improve Office for Civil Rights Enforcement
Both Congress and the Department of Education should take steps to improve OCR’s
enforcement of Title IX in peer sexual harassment cases, including by appropriating the funds to
increase staff and programs. Happily, the current administration is already making
improvements to the proactive guidance and the availability of its enforcement actions to the
public. However, these steps are only the beginning.
Specifically, OCR must continue to create proactive guidance giving more specific
instructions to schools about how to handle sexual harassment and violence directed at students.
The recent DCL, in particular its confirmation that the appropriate standard of proof for
disciplinary hearings on sexual harassment and violence is a preponderance of the evidence
standard,183 is already having an effect on schools, nearly a dozen of which have announced that
they have changed or are reviewing their standards in light of the guidance.184 The DSL also
clarifies such issues as the complaining and accused students’ equal rights to counsel,185 access
to and advance notice of witnesses and other evidence,186 and rights to appeal.187 Nevertheless,
certain questions are still open. There is particularly a need to better define a default “equitable”
rule by clarifying that, absent an OCR statement to the contrary, when a school gives a right of
182
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any kind to the accused student in a campus disciplinary proceeding or other procedure for
investigating complaints and determining responsibility and sanction in peer sexual violence
cases, that same right, of the same scope, must be given to the complaining student as well.
Better guidance is also needed on what constitutes institutional retaliation against survivors who
report. Finally, the guidance should include the creation and publication of a model sexual
violence and harassment policy and process for handling complaints under the policy.
To the extent that proactive guidance will never be able to address every question or
circumstance that arises under the law, OCR must increase the visibility of its complaint process
and the results of its investigations. Letters of Finding that conclude OCR investigations and any
“Commitments to Resolve” or settlements reached in such cases dating back to at least the early
1990s should be made accessible to the public through a FOIA electronic reading room. Since
DOE is currently engaging in a systemic FOIA violation, making these documents available is
required by law anyway and could keep schools and OCR from having to go through expensive
investigations if schools can resolve their questions up front and proactively comply. DOE could
publicize both the availability of the complaint process and the LOFs through sending
information directly to the student government or student media on a campus. Congress or DOE
could mandate that information about how to file complaints with DOE under both Clery and
Title IX is published in each school’s Clery report and is given to students as a part of the written
notification that would be required by the proposed Campus Sexual Violence Elimination
(SaVE) Act (see below for more details on the Campus SaVE Act). The DCL’s emphasis on the
role of Title IX Coordinators and its requirements for training for all personnel involved in
responding to sexual violence cases should also be used to disseminate information about the
complaint process and complaint resolutions by requiring the Title IX Coordinators to provide
information about OCR’s process to students (like OCR does on its “Know Your Rights” flyer)
and including OCR’s guidance and complaint process in personnel trainings.
As helpful as making the complaint process and the result of complaints more accessible
will be, OCR should also initiate more investigations or compliance reviews of schools. A
certain number of schools could be selected at random every year for a compliance
review/investigation. This would not only create incentives for schools to come into compliance
on their own, in anticipation of a review, but also provide an avenue for OCR’s technical
assistance services to be spread more evenly throughout institutions.
For both proactive and reactive investigations, OCR likely needs to develop methods of
achieving more consistency and accountability and a more unified approach among their
enforcement office investigators. Therefore, it should make efforts to improve its guidelines and
training for all investigators on the most effective investigatory techniques. Unless requested not
to do so by the complainant, investigations should at a minimum include talking to people
suggested by the complainant and, if policies and processes are at issue, to people in the campus
community through open forums or other gatherings of interested parties.
All of these improvements will of course require significantly more resources. Therefore,
Congress should appropriate more money for DOE to increase staffing and enforcement efforts.
While the current political climate might not be entirely conducive to immediate appropriation of
funds, better funding should remain on our list of priorities. In addition, if OCR were given the
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power to fine schools, such an approach would help fix two enforcement problems at once: first,
by providing OCR with an enforcement mechanism short of the “nuclear option” of withholding
all federal funds and second, by potentially adding a funding source for OCR’s work.
c. Amend the Clery Act
The Clery Act has been amended quite a bit since it was first passed, and a new set of
amendments has been proposed in this Congress, the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination
(SaVE) Act.188 In its current form, SaVE would add domestic violence, dating violence and
stalking to the statistics schools must collect, require schools to include in their annual security
report a statement of policy and procedures related to such offenses, mandate that schools
provide educational programming promoting awareness about the violence, and encourage
cooperation between the Departments of Education and Justice in providing assistance to schools
on best practices for responding to and preventing such offenses.189 The act further requires
schools’ procedures to notify student victims of their rights, disciplinary processes, victim
services, and safety planning, including how the school will enforce any protective order and
protect victim confidentiality.190 Finally, the school's policy must include the education
programming already mentioned, possible sanctions or protective measures imposed following
disciplinary action, and procedures available to victims post-violence, including to whom the
victim can report, disciplinary procedures, and the options for, and assistance available to change
academic, living, transportation, and working situations.191
While all of these amendments will be distinct improvements on the state of the law, they
do not primarily address the information problems and the way the Clery Act exacerbates those
problems. Therefore, several amendments should be added to the Campus SaVE Act or
proposed in another set of amendments.
If the Clery Act is ever going to reach the goal it was originally intended to reach, i.e. to
give prospective and current students and their parents accurate information about the incidence
of sexual violence on a particular campus, it needs to change fundamentally its approach to
collecting that information, specifically to stop depending on victim reporting. Clery should
therefore be amended to collect information about campus peer sexual violence (and any other
violent criminal behavior with similar non-reporting problems) in a manner more likely to
produce useful information that will both make it impossible for a campus to hide behind nonreporting and allow the school to address the problem properly.
More specifically, schools should be required to administer a standard survey developed
by DOE or a contractor every four years or similarly appropriate interval via a method that will
guarantee a high response rate (e.g. requiring a response to the survey in order to graduate or to
register for classes) and would ask students questions designed to determine the incidence of
sexual violence without depending on individual survivors to come forward to report. The
188
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results of the survey should be submitted to DOE and be published in the campus crime report.
DOE could also do statistical comparisons of survey results from schools and either make those
available to the public or give those compilations to schools confidentially for their own use,
along the lines of certain existing multi-school private surveys in which many schools participate
voluntarily.192
Such a survey would essentially remove the school from its current “middle-man”
position, where students report to the school and then the school reports to the public. The
survey would enable students to report directly to the public what is happening among students
on every campus across the country. School officials would receive campus-specific
information, and, if the trend demonstrated by studies done thus far is any judge, they will get
hard data indicating that their campus has just as much of a sexual violence problem as any
other. Such data will thus make it nearly impossible for a school to claim that, despite national
statistics, it is different from the national norm, unless the school actually is different. Schools
will no longer be able to bury their heads in the sand about this problem and pretend like the lack
of student reports indicates the lack of a problem. They will also have no incentives to minimize
reporting either passively or actively.
Such a survey does not necessarily need to replace in total Clery’s current reporting
structure, although it is worth considering whether the resources that schools and other entities
put towards meeting Clery’s current requirements would not be more efficiently and effectively
utilized with either such a survey and/or the victim services office discussed below. If the
reporting system remains in place, however, Clery must be amended to change its definitions and
methods of “counting” reports. Crimes should be counted in a manner that accounts for crimes
where both the survivor and alleged perpetrator are members of the campus community
(students, faculty and staff), regardless of where the crime occurred. Especially if combined
with a territorial approach, such a method would capture almost all crimes where the school has
both a responsibility to protect a student, faculty or staff member and/or some control over the
alleged perpetrator, the facilities where the crime took place or both. Counting based on people
involved would capture many crime reports involving student perpetrators but not taking place
on campus (say, in houses owned by fraternities or hotel rooms rented for parties), which is
where most campus peer sexual violence occurs.193 At the same time, the territorial approach
would capture crimes on campus committed against students or other members of the campus
community by outsiders. Together, these approaches would decrease schools’ discretion under
Clery and make the reporting system more accurate.
Other methods can also help minimize schools’ discretion in reporting and decrease
schools’ incentives to curtail reporting. All campus crime reports should be required to include
mandatory standard language explaining how to interpret the data, including some
acknowledgement of the significance of the non-reporting problem and the counterintuitive
meaning of more sexual violence reports. Like with Title IX, the complaint process should be
mandated to appear on every campus report, and DOE should engage in more proactive
enforcement, such as reviewing a random selection of campus crime reports for full compliance
with Clery, in addition to investigating complaints.
192
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Any amendments should also get rid of the FBI’s UCR Handbook, either by finding a
more modern model such as even the FBI’s own NIBRS edition of the UCR Handbook or by
creating new definitions just for the Clery Act. In particular, multiple perpetrators committing
multiple sexually violent acts against a single victim should be counted by violent act, not by
victim or by perpetrator (to account for those sexual assault scenarios where one perpetrator
commits multiple violent acts) and the definitions should allow male victims to be counted.
A final method, which ideally would be combined with the survey discussed above,
would be to require schools, either under Title IX or the Clery Act, to create certain programs
related to peer sexual violence and then to funnel reporting through those programs. For
instance, one of the most effective ways of addressing the myriad challenges of addressing peer
sexual violence on campus is to create a visible (yet confidential) and centralized victims’
services office. In my 2009 article, I focused on how such offices could play the role of
confidential advocate for survivors in a variety of campus settings and procedures. However,
they can also play critical roles for the institution, especially when it comes to reporting and
responding properly to such reports.
A victim services office can help with reporting by acting as a central location for both
services and reports. One can picture a campus student services system for sexual violence
victims as a metaphorical wheel, with a victims’ services office at the hub of the wheel and the
various places where a student might initially report at the ends of the wheel spokes. These
places can include the medical center, campus police, counseling services, residence life,
individual faculty, student conduct etc. This wheel-like structure allows the offices where a
student initially reports to immediately refer the student to the victims’ services office. That
office can likewise refer students out to the different offices from which they can get needed
services, thus alleviating a victim’s need to go from office to office trying to figure out the
system on her own.
The victims’ services office can also provide a critical role for the institution by being a
source of expertise in an area where schools need a lot more information and training, especially
in light of the training requirements and education recommendation contained in the DCL, which
will be strengthened further by the Campus SaVE Act, should it be enacted into law.194 Office
staff will have the background and knowledge to implement such training and education
programs and can provide deeper expertise in active cases. Faculty and staff can be minimally
trained in how to handle reports, mainly by referring them to the victims’ services office as the
campus expert, which usually is a relief to the majority of faculty and staff members, who do not
feel prepared to deal with such reports. Survivors are also more likely to report to a confidential
advocate and all-around resource, and such an office can provide raw numbers without breaching
confidentiality. Centralizing reports with a victims’ services office is one of the most effective
ways of both getting survivors to report and making sure an institution’s response is effective
once a report occurs.
In light of the benefits of such offices, the most effective way for the Clery Act to both
capture reports and ensure that sexual violence survivors’ rights are protected (as required by a
194
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different portion of the Clery Act, commonly referred to as the Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of
Rights) may very well be to mandate that every school create and professionally staff such an
office. Such an approach would not only raise reporting, but provide an on-campus expert who
would facilitate creation of the right policies and procedures, as well as preventative educational
programming. A legal regime that truly wants to end the campus peer sexual violence problem
could not do better than mandating such an office at every school.
IV.

Conclusion

In the half dozen or so presentations that I have given on my 2009 article on this subject,
at nearly every one a college administrator, usually from the judicial affairs or student conduct
office, has challenged my characterization of one piece of law related to campus peer sexual
violence as a myth. The particular legal controversy involved a supposed conflict between a
provision of the Clery Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).
FERPA generally does not allow educational institutions to disclose information from a student’s
educational record, which could include the results of student disciplinary proceedings, to
anyone besides the student unless the student gives written consent.195 However, as early as
2001, the OCR’s Revised Guidance made it clear that FERPA did not override the rights given
by Title IX.196 In addition, the implementing regulations for the Clery Act state “[c]ompliance
with this paragraph does not constitute a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (20 U.S.C. 1232g).”197 Despite this relative clear statement, schools were concerned about
whether the accuser, once informed of a disciplinary procedure’s outcome, could then re-disclose
that information. Many schools therefore required survivors to sign nondisclosure agreements
before they were informed of the outcome of disciplinary proceedings.198
Understandably, victims and victims’ advocates objected to such measures because they
compelled victims’ silence.199 In light of how difficult many survivors find it to come forward at
all, and the reasons listed above for why they do not report, such a “gag-rule” could facilitate
victim-blaming responses. Moreover, given the typical dynamics of campus sexual violence
cases (where the perpetrator and survivor know each other and have a common group of
acquaintances but where the alleged violence took place without any witnesses), survivors often
find their credibility being judged not only in formal disciplinary processes but also informally
by everyone around them.200 Getting a neutral panel to find that her account of events was
credible, never mind that what happened to her was wrong, can therefore be very important to a
survivor. An inability to re-disclose the very finding that establishes her credibility and her
assailant’s culpability significantly diminishes the value of going through the process at all.
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Even worse, it can allow the perpetrator to exploit the survivor’s compelled silence by lying
about the outcome to others. All in all, it sets a victim up to feel re-victimized by the system.201
In 2004, the Department of Education settled the question in response to a complaint filed
by a student survivor and Security on Campus. In its resolution of the complaint, the DOE made
clear that such compelled nondisclosure agreements were illegal under the Clery Act: “Under the
University’s policy, a student who refused to execute an agreement would be barred from
receiving judicial outcomes and sanctions information. As a result, a key aim of the Clery Act—
providing access to key information to be used by affected persons in their recovery process—is
defeated.”202 The Department of Education confirmed this judgment again in a November 2008
letter to another university in response to a complaint regarding a similar policy. In doing so, it
states that “by requiring survivors of alleged sexual assaults to abide by a confidentiality policy
that is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Clery Act,” the school had violated the Clery
Act.203
Despite all of these different pronouncements, in the fall of 2009 and spring and summer
of 2010, I was still being told by people who frankly should know better that FERPA precluded
student survivors from being told about the outcome and sanctions of the disciplinary proceeding
regarding her victimization. This might have been a lack of knowledge, as well as the preference
of non-lawyer administrators like these for bright-line rules (of which FERPA has plenty). Or it
may have involved active avoidance of this knowledge, either on the part of the attendees of
these workshops (who I am not at all convinced left my workshops believing that I was right
about this supposed conflict) or on the part of the people who are supposed to train them. Either
way, this constant challenge demonstrates how difficult it may be to move school officials in a
better direction.
In light of this resistance, the law absolutely must create consistent incentives
encouraging schools to adopt institutional responses that will ultimately help end the violence.
The primary liability scheme surrounding Title IX and the Clery Act creates such incentives, but
information problems exacerbated by these same laws push in the opposite and wrong direction.
The Clery Act must be amended, and both Title IX and Clery must be enforced differently and
better to change the current incentives toward lack of knowledge and knowledge avoidance into
incentives for ending the persistent problem of campus peer sexual violence.
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